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RIP CURRENTS: ROUGH WATER FOR 
END OF LIFE DECISION MAKING 
KATHY L. CERMINARA 
Every day brings news of another celebrity’s passing. In 2017 alone, 
comedian Jay Thomas died of cancer and country singer Glen Campbell died 
after a long struggle with Alzheimer’s Disease. South African rugby player Joost 
Heystek van der Westhuizen and American playwright, actor, and director Sam 
Shepard both passed away after long struggles with amyotrophic lateral 
sclerosis.1  We don’t know if these celebrities exerted control over their medical 
treatment choices during their final days, but we do know that some people 
suffering through such drawn-out illnesses wish to do so. If they have not and 
cannot do that themselves, loved ones will do so for them, ideally making the 
decisions they would have made. 
In the early days of end-of-life decision making law, technology such as the 
ventilator began forcing the law to catch up with evolving medical-ethical 
principles, to permit death to occur naturally in some cases even though 
technology existed to technically stave it off. Slightly more than forty years ago, 
in the first reported appellate end-of-life decision making case, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court ruled that Karen Ann Quinlan’s father, acting as her legal 
guardian, could authorize withdrawal of her ventilator support.2  Fewer than ten 
years later, in 1985, there were only eleven cases when research began for the 
first nationwide legal treatise on the law of end-of-life decision making.3 
Today, the cases have multiplied several-fold, yet the principles upon which 
the New Jersey Supreme Court based its decision in Quinlan remain surprisingly 
 
© Kathy L. Cerminara.  
 Kathy L. Cerminara, a co-author of Alan Meisel et al., The Right to Die: The Law of End-of-Life 
Decisionmaking (3d ed. 2004 & annual supplements) , is a professor of law at Nova Southeastern 
University Shepard Broad College of Law. Saamia Shaikh, J.D./D.O. assisted with research for this piece 
and deserves many thanks.  
 1. Lynn Elber, Jay Thomas, ‘Murphy Brown’ and ‘Cheers’ Actor, Radio Host, Dies at 69, CHI. TRIB. 
(Aug. 24, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/entertainment/tv/ct-jay-thomas-dead-20170824-
story.html; Megan French, Celebrity Deaths in 2017 Stars We’ve Lost, U.S. MAG. (Dec. 28, 2017), 
https://www.usmagazine.com/celebrity-news/pictures/celebrity-deaths-in-2017-stars-weve-lost-
w485884/june-foray-w494496/; South African Rugby Great Joost van der Westhuizen Dies from Motor 
Neurone Disease, ABC NEWS (Feb. 06, 2017), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-02-07/springboks-
great-joost-van-der-westhuizen-dies-at-45/8246582. 
 2. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 671 (N.J. 1976).  
 3. Professor Cerminara began work on THE RIGHT TO DIE in the summer of 1985, as the first 
research assistant working on the book. 
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unchanged. In end-of-life decision making law, the vast majority of cases in 
which patients or surrogates acting on their behalf wish to refuse life-sustaining 
treatment are governed by legal principles honoring patient autonomy. This is 
true across the states, with individual variations in details in accordance with 
principles of state sovereignty. 
Over the last 25 years the federal government has taken steps to assure that 
patient autonomy is honored at and near the end of life. First was the Patient Self-
Determination Act of 1990, when Congress reacted to the Cruzan4 decision by 
attempting to facilitate awareness of state law governing advance directives. 5 
Quite recently, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), adopted 
two billing codes affirmatively authorizing payment for time spent by a physician 
or other health care professional in advance care planning with patients.6 
Those events represent not only the current legal bookends of federal 
government involvement in end-of-life legal issues but also a shift in the law and 
medical professions away from emphasizing the mere completion of advance 
directives that accept or refuse particular end-of-life treatments. One example is 
Gundersen Health System’s work in LaCrosse, Wisconsin, in its Respecting 
Choices program: a series of conversations in which patients, health care 
professionals, and families discuss the entire continuum of care, addressing both 
choices of particular treatments and the values underlying those choices.7 The 
goals of such programs are both to assist patients themselves in thinking through 
the issues and to ensure that physicians and surrogate decision makers know what 
the patient wants to have done – or not done – if the patient loses capacity to 
make those decisions for himself or herself.  
Interestingly, patients and their families who had to fight for recognition of 
patient autonomy in the form of the ability to refuse life-sustaining treatments at 
the time of Quinlan – sometimes are important sources of pushback against 
termination of treatment. Eloquent authors such as Atul Gawande remind us that 
health care professionals are still uncomfortable with the end of life and that they 
are starved for training in conducting the types of discussions CMS seeks to 
 
 4. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
 5. See Patient Self-Determination Act of 1990, H.R. 4449, 101st Cong. (1990), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/101st-congress/house-bill/4449.  
 6. Frequently Asked Questions about Billing the Physician Fee Schedule for Advance Care 
Planning Services, CENTERS FOR MEDICAID & MEDICAID SERVS. (July 14, 2016), 
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-
Payment/PhysicianFeeSched/Downloads/FAQ-Advance-Care-Planning.pdf.  
 7. Respecting Choices, GUNDERSEN HEALTH SYSTEM, (Dec. 20, 2017) 
http://www.gundersenhealth.org/respecting-choices/; see also Bernard J. Hammes et al., A Comparative, 
Retrospective, Observational Student of the Prevalence, Availability, and Specificity of Advance Care 
Plans in a County That Implemented an Advance Care Planning Microsystem, 58 J. AM. GERIATRICS 
SOC’Y 1249 (2010) (concluding that “[a] system for [advance care planning] can be managed in a 
geographic region so that, at the time of death, almost all adults have an advance care plan that is specific 
and available and treatment is consistent with their plan.”). 
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encourage.8 Yet, in some ways it appears as if some patients and families believe 
that health care professionals have learned all too well that the technological 
imperative should be resisted near the end of life.9 
Specifically, this Essay highlights two trends in the case law that reflect the 
combination of scientific disagreement and surrogate concerns about “giving up 
too quickly.” Pushbacks against brain death diagnoses have appeared 
increasingly in recent years.10 The field is ripe for the same pushback to develop 
against persistent vegetative state diagnoses.11 Such pushbacks increasingly toss 
and turn in rip currents of public discourse about the cost of health care and 
disability rights. 
I. BRAIN DEATH 
This Essay begins at the end, so to speak – at least the end of life. For several 
years, disputes about brain death have featured heavily in annual supplements to 
The Right to Die: The Law of End-of-Life Decisionmaking. Very few of those 
disputes have resulted in “new law,” because most of them are unreported, and 
many are trial-level. They have, however, hit the headlines with a vengeance.12 
It seems that newspapers increasingly have written about families protesting 
brain death diagnoses, usually but not always parents protesting the deaths of 
their children. 
Stunningly, the most recent judicial trend in these cases has been to “side” 
with the parents, in one way or another. Jahi McMath, a little girl from California 
who went to the hospital for a tonsillectomy but suffered a terrible outcome,13 
may be the most famous, but she was only the tip of the iceberg. One case, in 
Virginia is currently pending regarding whether hospitals must obtain informed 
consent to administer apnea tests to determine death by neurological criteria.14  
 
 8. ATUL GAWANDE, BEING MORTAL: MEDICINE AND WHAT MATTERS IN THE END (2015). 
 9. Id. at 6. (“Modern scientific capability has profoundly altered the course of human life. People 
live longer and better than at any other time in history. But scientific advances have turned the processes 
of aging and dying into medical experiences, matters to be managed by health care professionals. And we 
in the medical world have proved alarmingly unprepared for it.”). 
 10. ALAN MEISEL ET AL., THE RIGHT TO DIE: THE LAW OF END-OF-LIFE DECISIONMAKING 
(hereinafter THE RIGHT TO DIE), at § 6.04 [A][1][a].  
 11. See Robert E. Cranford, What Is a Minimally Conscious State?, 176 WEST. J. MED 129, 129 
(discussing how “…many medical and ethical controversies still surround the vegetative state.”). 
 12. See, e.g., Fr. Mark Hodges, Girl at Center of ‘Brain Death’ Controversy Dies Before Nevada 
Hearing, LIFE SITE NEWS, (Jan. 7, 2016, 12:24 PM), https://www.lifesitenews.com/news/girl-sparking-
brain-death-controversy-dies-before-nevada-hearing; see also Celeste McGovern, Top Neurologist: Jahi 
McMath Is ‘No Longer’ Dead, NAT’L CATH. REGISTRAR (Nov. 30, 2015), 
http://www.ncregister.com/daily-news/top-neurologist-jahi-mcmath-is-no-longer-dead; Barbara Wallace, 
Mom Disputes Kaiser’s ‘Brain Dead’ Diagnosis, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV., (Apr. 28, 2016, 10:49 PM), 
http://www.courthousenews.com/2016/04/28/mom-disputes-kaisers-brain-dead-diagnosis.htm. 
 13. John M. Luce, The Uncommon Case of Jahi McMath, 147 CHEST 2255, 2256 (2015).  
 14. See Brief in Opposition-Appellee, Lawson v. VCU Medical Center, Record No. 161321,, Va. S. 
Ct. Sept. 19, 2016, available at http://www.thaddeuspope.com/images/Brief_in_Opposition_161321_09-
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Another case was decided in September, 2016, in a trial court in Montana.15 In 
both cases, the courts thus far have ruled that health care professionals may not 
perform apnea tests without the patients’ surrogates’ informed consent. It’s 
autonomy in action, but this autonomy is not being exercised to permit a patient 
to die. The autonomy sought here would permit a surrogate decision maker to 
prevent medical tests that would declare someone already dead. It is a way to cut 
off a true, quantitative, futility argument regarding biological support of a body 
believed to be dead.16 
In another important brain death case involving 20-year-old Aiden Hailu, 
the Nevada Supreme Court upended the law of brain death in that state.17 Nevada 
had adopted the whole-brain-death definition contained within the Uniform 
Determination of Death Act (UDDA).18 Not unusually, however, its statute also 
provided that the determination of death must be made in accordance with 
accepted medical standards.19 Nearly a month before Ms. Hailu’s medical 
mishap, the hospital in which she was a patient performed three 
electroencephalogram (EEG) tests.20 They revealed she was not brain dead.21 
More than a month later, however, the hospital staff performed an apnea test, 
which she failed.22 The hospital staff notified her father, who was her guardian, 
that they intended to discontinue her ventilator and other biological support.23 He 
objected and sought a temporary restraining order preventing the hospital from 
removing the technology.24 
 
19-16_.pdf; Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, In re A.C., No. DG-16-08, (Sept. 26, 2016), 
available at http://www.thaddeuspope.com/images/Order_Denying_SVH_Motion_23sept2016.pdf. 
 15. James B., Mother Intervenes to Keep ‘Brain Dead’ Montana Boy Alive’, CROSSMAPS 
http://www.crossmap.com/news/mother-intervenes-to-keep-brain-dead-montana-boy-alive-30936 (last 
visited Nov. 20, 2017); Calixto Machado et al., Brain Death Diagnosis and Apnea Test Safety, 12 ANNALS 
OF INDIAN ACAD. OF NEUROLOGY 197 (2009) (explaining that an apnea test involves taking a patient off 
ventilator support for ten minutes to see if she can breathe on her own).  
 16. James L. Bernat, Medical Futility, Definition, Determination, and Disputes in Critical Care, 2 
NEUROCRITICAL CARE 198 (2005)( describing how in medicine, futility is the notion that further medical 
treatment or therapy should not be pursued due to a patient’s irreversible condition and thus inability to 
improve).  
 17. See In re Guardianship of Hailu, 361 P.3d 524 (Nev. 2015). 
 18. NEV. REV. STAT. § 451.007 (LexisNexis 2017).(Nevada requires that the determination of death 
shall be made “in accordance with accepted medical standards”);Uniform Determination of Death Act , 
UNIFORM L. COMMISSION  (1980), 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/determination%20of%20death/udda80.pdf; see also 
Determination of Death Act Summary, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Determination%20of%20Death%20Act (last 
visited Dec. 13, 2016).   
 19. NEV. REV. STAT. § 451.007 (LexisNexis 2017).  
 20. See In re Guardianship of Hailu, 361 P.3d at 525. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
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The hospital had used American Association of Neurology (AAN) 
guidelines, which it argued constituted the generally accepted medical standard 
in determining that Ms. Hailu was brain-dead.25 AAN guidelines, however, could 
have resulted in a different conclusion from an EEG examination looking for loss 
of whole-brain activity.26 The trial court ruled in favor of the hospital because 
generally accepted medical standards (the AAN guidelines) indicated that Ms. 
Hailu was brain-dead.27 The Nevada Supreme Court reversed, holding that the 
legislature, in adopting the UDDA, intended to ensure that the brain was not 
functioning at all before declaration of death.28 It also held that the UDDA sought 
to achieve uniformity in diagnosis by requiring that determinations of death “be 
made in accordance with accepted medical standards” and “applied and 
construed in a manner uniform among the states which enact it.”29 
While the trial court had determined that hospital personnel had satisfied 
the AAN guidelines, and that AAN guidelines constituted an accepted medical 
standard in Nevada, that court erred by failing to consider whether those 
guidelines constituted accepted medical standards applied uniformly throughout 
UDDA states. Only then, the Nevada Supreme Court  ruled, would AAN 
guidelines suffice to support a diagnosis of brain death under the UDDA.30 The 
court noted that the generally accepted medical standard at the time of the 
promulgation of the UDDA required confirmatory EEG testing, while the AAN 
guidelines do not. It would not rule that the AAN guidelines had replaced 
previous generally accepted criteria (the “Harvard criteria”), but it remanded the 
case to the trial court for additional evidence and reconsideration of whether a 
 
 25. Id. at 526. 
 26. Id. at 527. A diagnosis of brain death follows the successful completion of a number of 
prerequisites. They include a clinical evaluation, neurological testing examining the absence of cerebral 
or brainstem function by testing the patient’s reflexes, as well as imaging tests such as the 
electroencephalogram (EEG), the apnea test, and other ancillary diagnostic tests. Only after all other 
diagnostic criteria have been satisfied may the apnea test be performed. The apnea test is required for the 
diagnosis of brain death and involves disconnecting the patient from the ventilator and supplying oxygen 
via a nasal cannula. Any spontaneous respiratory efforts are noted and the partial pressure of arterial 
carbon dioxide (PaCO2) is measured. Absent visualization of any respiratory efforts and a PaCO2 over 60 
mmHg (or in some cases 20 mmHg over the baseline), the patient meets the criteria for brain death. An 
EEG is a useful confirmatory test for the diagnosis of brain death and involves connecting electrodes to 
the scalp and measures electrical activity in the brain by recording summated synaptic potentials. An 
isoelectric or flat recording for 30 minutes confirms the diagnosis. See generally Brain Death 
Determination / Apnea Testing, THE DEPARTMENT OF SURGICAL EDUCATION, ORLANDO REGIONAL 
MEDICAL CENTER, (Oct. 10, 2009), 
http://www.surgicalcriticalcare.net/Guidelines/brain_death_determination_2009.pdf; see also generally 
Zhe Chen et al., An Empirical EEG Analysis in Brain Death Diagnosis for Adults, 2 COGNITIVE 
NEURODYNAMICS, 257 (2008); G Bryan Young, Diagnosis of Brain Death, UPTODATE, 
http://www.uptodate.com/contents/diagnosis-of-brain-death (last updated May 27, 2015). 
 27. See In re Guardianship of Hailu, 361 P.3d at 527–28. 
 28. Id. at 532. 
 29. Id. at 531. 
 30. Id. 
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determination of death using the AAN guidelines would satisfy the state’s 
statutory test.31 
Ms. Hailu died of cardiopulmonary arrest while the case was pending at the 
trial court, before the trial court could hold a hearing on the issue to be decided 
on remand. Her death ended the case on its facts, but the Nevada legislature took 
up the matter in its next legislative session.32 Now Nevada law provides that 
physicians determining death must use the AAN guidelines. 
Brain death has always been a bit suspect to some, due in part to 
philosophical33 and religious objections34 but also due to its utilitarian roots.35 
One might believe that death is a matter of fact; Merriam Webster Dictionary 
defines it as “a permanent cessation of all vital functions: the end of life.”36 One 
might also think that determining when that cessation occurs is a matter of 
medical science. After all, vital functions are concerned with or necessary to the 
maintenance of life” and medical personnel objectively measure respiration and 
circulation of the blood.37 When it set forth its definition of brain death, the 
faculty at Harvard Medical School stated that “the law treats [the question of 
when a patient is dead] essentially as one of fact to be determined by 
physicians.”38 Yet the law delineating when a physician may declare a patient 
dead differs from state to state, suggesting that death – as Ben Rich has written -
- cannot be determined “by discovering, as an objective, scientific fact of the 
matter, but rather . . . by deciding, through a social consensus hopefully 
supported by the most reliable scientific information.”39 
 
 31. Id.  
 32. NEV. REV. STAT. § 451.007 (LexisNexis 2017). 
 33. D. Alan Shewmon, Constructing the Death Elephant: A Synthetic Paradigm Shift for the 
Definition, Criteria, and Tests for Death, 35 J. MED. PHIL. 256, 274 (2010). 
 34. See, e.g., 10 N.Y.C.R.R. § 400.16 (requiring policies and procedures for reasonable 
accommodation of objections to death by neurological criteria); N.J. STAT. § 26:6A-5 (requiring use of 
respiratory-cardiac death when conscientious objections to death by neurological criteria exist); see also 
CALIF. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1254.4 (providing for a short period of reasonable accommodation in 
cases of religious and cultural objections); 210 ILL. CONS. STAT. § 85/6.23 (requiring that hospitals take 
patients’ religious beliefs into account when determining time of death); see generally L. Syd M. Johnson, 
The Case for Reasonable Accommodation of Conscientious Objections to Declarations of Brain Death, 
13 J. BIOETHICAL INQUIRY 105, 109 (2016) (advocating further adoption of statutes like New Jersey’s).  
 35. There is little dispute that the reason the Ad Hoc Committee of Harvard Medical School faculty 
adopted a brain death standard was the rise of transplantation or organs. Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard 
Medical School, A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 85, 85 (1968) [hereinafter Ad 
Hoc]. 
 36. Death, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/death. 
(last visited Apr. 01, 2018). 
 37. Vital Function, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/vital (last visited Apr. 01, 2018). 
 38. Ad Hoc, supra note 35 at 87. 
 39. See THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 10, at 604 (quoting Ben A. Rich, Structuring Conversations 
on the Fact and Fiction of Brain Death, 14 AM. J. BIOETHICS 31, 31 (2014)); see also Don Marquis, Death 
as a Legal Fiction, 14 AM. J. BIOETHICS 28, 28 (2014). 
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The development of the law governing determination of death illustrates 
the importance of social consensus while reminding us of its changing nature.40 
The trend of pushback against brain death diagnoses from families could cause 
one to wonder where social consensus may take us in the future. Perhaps it means 
that there are more families unable to accept death now than a few decades ago 
– even after a period of a few days during which their loved ones’ functions are 
maintained to permit them time to reach acceptance. Perhaps it is about increased 
ability to publicize protests due to 24-hour news reporting and the Internet. 
Maybe it is about an increasing number of families having more “guts” to protest 
in light of more positive attention being paid to other objectors. 
Or it could reflect one of the rip currents mentioned earlier. Increased 
discussions of the cost of health care surrounding the passage and 
implementation (and potential demise) of the Affordable Care Act have forced a 
broader swath of the public to acknowledge resource limits in medicine.41 All of 
the cases just mentioned involved relatively sudden deaths, from near-
drowning42 and choking on popcorn43 to mishaps in surgery.44 Couple those 
shocks to the patients’ families with currently frequent media accounts of high 
health care costs and scarcities of other types in health care facilities,45 and you 
have a recipe for disbelief.46 Couple that natural disbelief with talk about 
resource shortages and add, in half of these cases, the fact that the families are 
members of minority populations pre-disposed to distrust the medical 
establishment in any event, and you have the potential for intransigent 
 
 40. THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 10, at 604. 
 41. Glenn Llopis, Population Health Offers Three Critical Lessons For the Future of Our Country, 
Part 2, FORBES, (Nov. 25, 2016, 4:30 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/glennllopis/2016/11/25/population-health-offers-three-critical-lessons-for-
the-future-of-our-country-part-2/2/#66954936733f.  
 42. James L. Bernat, supra note 16. 
 43. Brief in Opposition-Appellee, Lawson v. VCU Medical Center, supra note 14. 
 44. See In re Guardianship of Hailu, 361 P.3d at 525; VINCENT J. RUSSO & MARVIN RACHLIN, NEW 
YORK ELDER LAW AND SPECIAL NEEDS PRACTICE 314–315 (2016 ed. 2016).  
 45. Vincent Mor, Why Now? Concerns About End-Of-Life Health Care Policy, HEALTH AFF. BLOG, 
(Dec. 19, 2016), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/12/19/why-now-concerns-about-end-of-life-health-
care-policy/.  
 46. This is true even though the actual time between the injury-producing incidents and health care 
professionals’ desires to call or test for brain death appears benign in these cases. That timing reveals that 
most of these families had been given at least a few days, and one up to a month, to accept the news. See 
generally In re Guardianship of Hailu, 361 P.3d; James B., supra note 16; Brief in Opposition-Appellee, 
Lawson v. VCU Medical Center, supra note 14; RUSSO & RACHLIN, supra note 44. Jahi McMath had 
approximately three days. Aden Hailu went in to surgery April 1st and had EEGs two weeks after; an apnea 
test performed on April 28th and subsequently was determined brain dead. June 2nd was the date physicians 
decided to take Aden off the respirator. In Montana, on July 22nd, Allen Calloway went 5–15 minute 
without oxygen when he experienced a near-drowning incident. On July 27th consent to perform an apnea 
test was obtained and the test was performed the following day on the 28th. By law, a second form of 
consent should have been obtained on July 29th but was not. In the Virginia case, Mirranda Lawson had 
approximately 9 days (May 11th– May 20th).  
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disagreement.47 Another confounding factor may be economic; the United States 
Supreme Court has recognized that patients with low incomes may properly be 
considered a vulnerable group in a system in which obtaining health care depends 
at least in part on the ability to pay for it.48 
To be blunt, at least some of the increase in brain-death protests may result 
from families increasingly believing practitioners are “too quick” to check for 
and call brain death because of the need for organs, the cost of maintaining the 
patient, or a need for beds.49 
None of that suspicion means that the health care professionals involved 
were indeed acting too quickly, or that they were wrong, or acting improperly or 
unethically. It does, however, imply that the backlash against brain death 
diagnoses may continue and even become more common over the next few years. 
It would be an interesting empirical study to collect, compare, and contrast the 
facts underlying the highly publicized pushbacks of the past few years, especially 
their injury-producing incidents, timing, the reasons families voiced protest or 
disbelief, and patient, family, and facility demographics. 
II. PERSISTENT VEGETATIVE STATE 
The other trend is currently more apparent in science than in the law, but 
the past teaches us that the two inevitably will combine in future cases. As 
neuroscientific research progresses, another diagnosis that has proven 
troublesome to many is the persistent vegetative state (PVS). End-of-life 
decision-making law effectively began in Quinlan with a patient in a PVS.50 
Today, that diagnosis has come under increased scrutiny as technology including 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and the electroencephalogram 
(EEG) has shed more light on what it means to be “conscious” or “unconscious” 
and “aware” or “unaware.”51  
 
 47. See generally In re Guardianship of Hailu, 361 P.3d; RUSSO & RACHLIN, supra note 44. See also 
Alina M. Perez and Kathy L. Cerminara, La Caja De Pandora: Improving Access to Hospice Care among 
Hispanic and African-American Patients, 10 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 255, 277 (2010) (discussing 
some of the cultural barriers and issues that predispose individuals to physician distrust).  
 48. Glucksberg v. Washington, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 49. Atul Gawande, Letting Go: What Should Medicine Do When It Can’t Save Your Life?, NEW 
YORKER (Aug. 2, 2010), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/08/02/letting-go-2.  
 50. In re Quinlan, supra note 2, at 647–48. 
 51. See THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 10. Human consciousness can be broken down into two 
components—arousal (wakefulness) and awareness. A comatose state is characterized by a lack of both 
arousal and awareness. Although advancements in medicine have allowed for the recovery of most 
patients from a comatose state within ten days, some will permanently lose all brain functions (i.e. brain 
death) and others will evolve in to a wakeful yet unaware state. Characterized by an aroused state but a 
lack of awareness, in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) (also known as unresponsive wakefulness 
syndrome (UWS)), patients may open and close their eyes but are not exhibiting any kind of responsive 
or voluntary conduct as they lack awareness of their surroundings. Rather, PVS patients are exhibiting 
reflexive behavior in response to some external stimuli. In contrast, a minimally conscious state (MCS) is 
characterized by arousal as well as a minimal amount of awareness that is manifested by inconsistent yet 
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The vast majority of end-of-life decision-making cases involve patients in 
PVS.52 This is not surprising given that a patient in a PVS, although having been 
diagnosed as being “wakeful but unaware,” may seem aware to a loving family 
at the bedside.53 Terri Schiavo’s family is perhaps the most famous contemporary 
example of this phenomenon; most Americans likely saw the video clips in 
which Terri seemed to be following a balloon in the air and gazing at her 
mother.54 Many medical professionals may have had doubts at that point;55 
consider what the emotional impact on a  loving family member who wanted 
Terri to be aware must have been. 
The belief that Ms. Schiavo was not in a PVS propelled litigation lasting 
seven years, and that was before the bulk of the fMRI and EEG research that 
some believe today could call into question some PVS diagnoses.56 While small-
scale studies have indicated that some patients with VS diagnoses may be 
somewhat aware, the research is in its early stages.57 Moreover, there is no reason 
to believe that patients with minimal levels of awareness would wish to continue 
treatment.58 Especially if they have executed written advance directives, they 
even may have constitutional rights to refuse treatment overwhelming any state 
interests asserted to require that they be in a PVS – or any other specified 
condition for that matter – for their advance directives to be given effect.59 
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NEUROLOGY 537, 538 (2004).  
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 54. Id. 
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(discussing how Senator Bill Frist, a physician, said at that time that he did not believe she was in a PVS 
after reviewing the video clips). 
 56. The litigation lasted from 1998 until 2005, while fMRI and EEG research began around or after 
2000. See Steven Laureys and Nicholas D. Schiff, Coma and Consciousness: Paradigms (re)framed by 
Neuroimaging, 61 NEUROIMAGE 478, 479 (2011).   
 57. See THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 10, at 612–15.  
 58. Id. at 614–615. 
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The bottom line at this time is that the law imposes different requirements 
in cases of minimally conscious patients than in cases of patients in PVS, and it 
will have to develop somewhat to honor the autonomy of those patients who wish 
to refuse treatment in minimally conscious states (MCS). Even sooner, however, 
as in Schiavo, a court is likely to once again be asked to prohibit withholding or 
withdrawing treatment from a patient because of differences in belief regarding 
whether the patient is in a PVS. This time, there may – with a strong emphasis 
on “may” – be more scientific evidence on the side of the people saying the 
patient is not truly in a PVS. And, of course, much depends on the particular facts 
that reach a court, such as the patient’s condition and its cause. 
As we learned at the time of Schiavo, the rip current of publicity that can 
be created by the disability rights movement is powerful. If a patient is aware 
rather than unaware, then she is a step closer to some people with significant 
intellectual or developmental disabilities than Ms. Schiavo was. During Schiavo, 
we saw how vulnerable traditional bioethics can be to the disability critique.60 
Arguments about valuing those who are differently abled have been asserted 
since at least the Bouvia case in California in 1986.61 Pleas for acknowledgement 
and conversation came to the forefront during and after Schiavo, resulting in 
authors like Dean Alicia Ouellette seeking to increase cultural competence 
regarding persons with disabilities among bioethicists.62 As the Affordable Care 
Act increases focus on health equity (assuming its health equity provision is not 
repealed),such cultural competence should be increasingly valued not only in 
bioethics near the end of life, but also throughout bioethics, medicine and many 
other professions.63  
Authors such as Dean Ouellette and Professor Lois Shepherd, among 
others, take pains to note that persons with disabilities should not be robbed of 
their liberty to refuse treatment, either.64 But suspicion remains about PVS, 
fueled at least in part by the visuals associated with the PVS itself.65 Combine a 
history of social vulnerability and stigma, visuals capable of leading many to 
believe that patients in PVS are in fact at least minimally conscious, neurological 
research that supports further exploration of such a possibility in some cases, and 
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the previously mentioned talk about the high cost of health care and scarcity of 
resources. The result is rather plain to see: future disputes are likely to raise 
questions about whether patients are actually in PVS more often and more 
overtly than before. As we proceed into the future, recognition of valid concerns 
underlying such protests, even if they are not factual, will be increasingly 
important. 
III. CONCLUSION 
This Essay has examined two recent trends in the law of end-of-life decision 
making tossing in rip currents of public concern. Families of patients 
increasingly have pushed back in spectacularly public ways against two 
diagnoses in particular: brain death and PVS. Such rough waters are likely to 
continue due to the social, economic, and cultural realities of medicine, the health 
care industry, and health care coverage. America’s history of inconsistency and 
sometimes irrationality in access to health care services only helps churn the 
waves as patients near the ends of their lives. 
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